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 Chapter 6 
 
Negotiated Revolutions 
 
 
 
 
It is incredible how many systems of morality and politics have been successively 
found, forgotten, rediscovered, forgotten again, only to reappear later, always 
charming and surprising the world as if they were new, and bearing witness, not to 
the fecundity of the human spirit but to the ignorance of men.1 
 
Heeding Alexis de Tocqueville’s warning of the ‘ignorance of men’, this chapter 
does not make any particular claim of ‘newness’. Rather, it looks backwards as 
well as forwards, illustrating the relative novelty of the concept of negotiated 
revolution through comparison, both theoretical and empirical, with the great 
revolutions of the modern era. At all times, the three case studies employed in this 
book are used to challenge its theoretical assertions. The Chilean case, in 
particular, is used as a counterfactual to test the central argument – that, as the 
principal examples of relatively peaceful, yet revolutionary, transformations 
between autocracies and market democracies, negotiated revolutions have distinct 
and profound consequences both for the international system in general, and for 
those states facing similar contexts and pressures in particular. 
 
 
Homogeneity and Difference 
 
From the Reaganite conception of America as a ‘city on a hill’, to Germany’s 
Sonderweg (special path), and South Africa’s ‘Rainbow Nation’, it is 
commonplace for states around the world to suppose a degree of exceptionalism. In 
many ways, this self-identified ‘uniqueness’ is well founded. At the most detailed 
level of thick experience, all countries are sui generis: the myths and legends that 
make up national identity are particular to each state, invented or otherwise.
2
 Yet, a 
retreat into the micro-narratives that divide states from each other fails to do justice 
to the more general trajectories which unite them, whether this be the triviality of 
national emblems or the more serious business of shared economies, peoples and 
history. In the contemporary era, the most powerful of these generic tendencies is 
modernity itself: the range of political, economic and social processes which have 
served to recast domestic and international orders over the last four or five hundred 
                                                 
1 Tocqueville quoted in Wight, Porter and Wight (eds) (2002: 5). 
2 On nationalism as an ‘invented tradition’, see Anderson (1991). For a counter-view, see 
Smith (1986, 1998).  
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years. The resulting constellations – the states-system, capitalism, patriarchy and 
the like – are structures that contain a global reach.  
In many ways, therefore, global history over the last half-millennium is a 
shared story: struggles for and against colonialism, the extension of trade around 
the world and technological advances have, with varying degrees of coercion, 
brought the world within some kind of public commons. In this sense, modernity 
is, as Ernest Gellner puts it, a ‘tidal wave’ of homogenizing pressures.3 But the 
tsunami has not been equally or evenly felt: the commodification of labour, 
urbanization, bureaucratization, gender equality, universal suffrage and the like 
may have penetrated even the most inhospitable of environments, but they have not 
done so in a uniform manner. The systemic dislocations wrought by modernity 
have provoked a multiplicity of responses: global capitalism and autarky, market-
democracy and authoritarianism, fundamentalism and secularism. At its heart, 
modernity appears to be an inherently contradictory process, one marked by greater 
affluence but also rising inequality; global forms of governance alongside a drive 
to local autonomy.
4
 
The various reactions to modernity initiated by state leaders and their 
citizens have prompted diverse evolutionary paths. While some states have reached 
a relatively peaceful accommodation with these processes, others have been torn 
asunder by the break-up of old ways of life. Violent revolutions, wars and civil 
strife have left their own indelible mark on world history. Negotiated revolutions 
are the latest instalment in this ongoing saga: a reminder of the continuing 
struggles people face in coping with the dislocating effects afforded by modernity. 
As such, negotiated revolutions are at the same time both a welcome reminder of 
the solidarity of world historical processes and a cautionary tale into the 
particularity of the human experience. Social upheaval is an endemic feature of 
world history, but the form it takes varies across time and place. In what ways, 
therefore, do negotiated revolutions conform or contrast to the type of revolutions 
found under modernity?  
Many theorists contend that ‘modern revolutions’, the type ushered in by 
the French Revolution a little over two centuries ago, pass through a series of 
stages. Crane Brinton, for example, bases his analysis of revolutionary anatomy on 
the path of the French Revolution from an initial period of moderacy to the 
‘Terror’ of the Jacobins and the ‘Thermidor’ of July 1794.5 Jaroslav Krejčí, in turn, 
argues that revolutions pass through a number of stages: onset, compression, 
explosion, oscillation, expansion, tightening, reversal, restoration and 
consolidation.
6
 In numerous texts, Fred Halliday refers to the modularity of 
revolutionary outcomes as constituting, in turn,: a period of grace, domestic 
radicalism, accommodation and instability.
7
 It is important to be careful about 
extrapolating in this way from one revolution to another without recourse to 
                                                 
3 See Gellner (1983). 
4 For more on the double nature of modernity and globalization, see Clark (1997). 
5 See Brinton (1965). 
6 See Krejčí (1994). 
7 See, for example, Halliday (1994). 
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contingency and particularity. If history tells us anything, it is to be cautious when 
employing terms like generality and necessity. Yet, there are some general features 
that can be extrapolated from modern revolutions: causes rooted in systemic crisis; 
the development of a condition of multiple sovereignty; a call to arms based on a 
utopian vision; a takeover of state institutions; the attempt to export revolution 
internationally; counter-revolution; and the growth of stronger, more bureaucratic, 
often tyrannical states.
8
  
Negotiated revolutions move away from these prevalent patterns in five 
main ways. From a suspicion of revolution which frequently led to counter-
revolution, the international, both in terms of structure and agency, actively 
welcomes the insurgent states. The utopian vision that often resulted in extremism 
is exchanged for a revolutionary ideology rooted in longer-term principles of 
freedom, a return to normalcy and a desire to ‘catch up’ with other states. A violent 
conflict between rival forces is replaced by the acceptance of mutual dependency, 
the undesirability of ongoing civil conflict and a greater role for structural, latent 
forms of violence. From a fight to the finish comes a process in which the old 
regime and revolutionaries together negotiate the destruction of the old order and 
the birth of a new nation. Rather than the creation of a stronger, more bureaucratic 
state, a relatively weak state emerges both in terms of despotic authority and 
infrastructural capacity, hemmed in by independent actors, both national and 
international. As such, negotiated revolutions are tangible signs of an imminent 
modularity in world politics in which radical change is based around the idea of 
liberation rather than the dream of utopia. 
  
From Burke to Paine  
 
Revolutions are intricately bound up with the international. First, they are, to an 
extent, reliant on international context. During the Cold War, for example, a 
relatively impermeable operating environment tended to foreclose opportunities for 
revolutionary change. Any disruption to the status quo was considered, usually by 
both blocs, as a hazardous disruption to the global constellation of forces. In this 
way, the United States favoured authoritarian strongmen, most noticeably in the 
Americas, even at the cost of democratically elected heads of state. For their part, 
the Soviet Union rarely intervened openly to help even apparent allies in the 
developing world, at least at nothing like the level of assistance offered by, for 
example, Fidel Castro in Cuba.
9
 Over the past two centuries, international 
                                                 
8 Even within such a loose taxonomy, there are still exceptions. For example, the Mexican 
Revolution was an uprising against an authoritarian regime rather than a movement for an 
alternative utopian future, at least until the intervention of Lázaro Cárdenas del Río and his 
nationalization drive during the late 1930s.  
9 There is increasing evidence, however, that the Soviet Union supported revolutions in the 
developing world covertly. At a seminar held at the London School of Economics in 
November 2003, Vladimir Shubin, a Russian expert on Southern Africa, claimed that the 
Soviet Union were involved in 19 conflicts in the Third World during the Cold War. 
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statesmen and diplomats whatever their overt political orientation have tended to 
view revolutions with Burkean suspicion, often backed up by active support for 
counter-revolutionary measures.
10
 Order, time and again, has trumped demands for 
justice. 
 However, the end of the Cold War led to an opening up of this closed 
international order and removed many of the negative connotations associated with 
revolutionary change. The apparent ‘triumph’ of market democracy and the 
collapse of a viable alternative system acted as a spur for radical change around the 
world. As long as revolutionaries framed their story as one of a return to normalcy 
(Chile), emancipation from the Soviet yoke (the Czech Republic) or as liberation 
from a system whose time had long since passed (South Africa), as long as they 
agreed to abide by a series of neo-liberal reforms and signed up to a welter of 
international institutions and normative frameworks, so the great powers welcomed 
what had previously been outcast states into the community of nations. Burkean 
suspicion was supplanted by an almost Paine-like enthusiasm. Just cause was given 
a rare opportunity for realization.  
International assistance for negotiated revolutions varied from the 
normative (the recognition of the legitimacy of the revolutionary struggle) to the 
material (aid packages, election monitors and so on). The revolutionary 
transformations in the Czech Republic and South Africa succeeded because of the 
structural opening afforded by the end of the Cold War and the active support of 
international agencies – state departments, key individuals and global institutions 
alike. In Chile, the international played a major role in the transition, witnessed for 
example by the example effect of democratization in neighbouring states, the US 
government’s partial funding for the ‘No’ campaign against the dictatorship, and 
the pressure applied by Washington on the junta to accept the result of the 1988 
plebiscite on whether the military regime should stand down. But this support 
stopped some way short of actively welcoming a revolutionary transformation that 
could upset the Chilean economy and destabilize the region. As a result, the end of 
the Pinochet era in Chile was greeted by a whimper compared to the wholesale 
celebrations around the world that marked the collapse of communism in the Czech 
Republic and the end of apartheid in South Africa.  
 One of the striking elements of negotiated revolutions is the 
transformation that they induce in foreign policy. Rather than building up armies in 
order to shore up their regimes from internal and external enemies, both the Czech 
Republic and South Africa have sought to join and strengthen international 
institutions and organizations. In the Czech Republic, post-revolutionary foreign 
policy has turned firmly to the West, hence accession to NATO in 1999 and the 
European Union in 2004, and the commitment by the Czech government to 
military action in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. And South Africa, once the 
                                                 
10 The importance of counter-revolution lies in what Philip Windsor calls ‘the vulnerability 
of the great powers’. In order to maintain their position, status and credibility, great powers 
are forced to quell moments of disorder, intervening in order to demonstrate their 
steadfastness against threats to their hegemony. This ‘system-pressure’ is, as Windsor points 
out, a kind of ‘weakness-in-strength’. For a fuller discussion of this, see Bisley (2004). 
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world’s ‘polecat’, now plays an active part in a number of international agencies, 
standing as a pivot between north and south and as a standard bearer for 
developing nations. Both states pursue a form of internationalism that sees them 
punch above their weight in global bodies. 
 
From Utopia to Normalcy  
 
By eschewing the obedience to a particular ideology that served to legitimize many 
of the excesses carried out in the name of revolutions in the past, negotiated 
revolutions avoid the patterns of domestic and international terror, counter 
revolution, autarky and war that have characterized many previous revolutions. 
Negotiated revolutions seek to build a new order without the despotic coercive 
control exerted by their predecessors, one that boasts a commitment to democratic 
political relations defined by a written, liberal constitution; regular, free elections 
competed over by a range of political parties; the separation of the state from the 
security apparatus and the military; and an internationalist perspective which 
demands an active role in relevant international institutions and organizations. 
Economically, negotiated revolutions undergo programmes of liberalization and 
privatization that open up the domestic market to foreign competition, establish an 
independent financial sector and maintain trade policies in keeping with prevailing 
international regimes. Socially, negotiated revolutions foster a relatively open 
environment featuring a free media and education system; enshrine equality of 
race, gender and religion in law; and develop a means by which to reconcile past 
injustices, usually by way of a truth commission.  
In this, there are some notable differences between Chile, South Africa 
and the Czech Republic. It was only when the opposition in Chile renounced 
ideology and proceeded through elite pacts that the movement gained the trust of 
both business elites and leading social sectors. In the other two cases, although 
revolutionaries moved away from any concept of total victory, ideals were never 
removed from the revolution itself. Nelson Mandela powerfully evoked principles 
of peaceful change, liberation and freedom. For his part, Václav Havel consistently 
framed his actions, along with those of the revolutionary movement in general, as 
embodiments of his concept of ‘living in truth’. At all times, revolutionaries in 
South Africa and the Czech Republic paid overt homage to ideals in a way that 
Chilean leaders expressly disavowed.  
Truth commissions are perhaps the best means of assessing the novel role 
of ideology in negotiated revolutions. All revolutions require some mechanism for 
dealing with the injustices of the old order, a means of moving from old to new 
which establishes the authority and legitimacy of the incoming regime while also 
providing an outlet for people’s sense of outrage and thirst for revenge. In the past, 
these needs were satiated through a mixture of firing squads, guillotines, show 
trials, gulags and purges. Negotiated revolutions, founded on principles of 
restorative rather than punitive or retributive justice, institute truth commissions as 
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an innovative way of dealing with these issues.
11
 The character and outcomes of 
truth commissions closely reflect the nature of both the polity and the particular 
society within which they take place: secretive and repressed in Chile, kept firmly 
behind closed doors by an old guard determined to cling onto power; messy and 
violent in South Africa, a perambulating Pandora’s box held in full gaze of a 
disorientated public; uncertain and limited in the Czech Republic, where the main 
body of evidence was police files held over from the communist era. There is, 
therefore, no single route map for societies escaping from, or seeking to escape 
from, entrenched conflict. In South Africa, the truth commission has been a 
valuable symbolic tool representing the birth of a new nation; in Chile, it was only 
the arrest of the former dictator in 1998 that moved the transition on apace; in the 
Czech Republic, a flawed law – lustrace – has failed to provide a sense of 
resolution between an autocratic past and a democratic future.
 
What these processes share is a commitment to the generation of a 
foundational narrative for a new nation out of which a collective rather than a 
disjointed history can emerge. As such, they fulfil the age-old need to provide an 
outlet for the victims of the old regime, a moment when innocent people get the 
chance to tell stories which would otherwise go unheard, a weapon of the weak 
turned back against seemingly almighty oppressors. But at the same time, they 
perform this task in a novel fashion – by trading truth for punishment. For all their 
flaws, TRC’s represent central elements in the ideological differentiation of 
negotiated revolutions from past examples of revolutionary change. They are one 
element of the attempt to reconcile what were apparently intractable differences. 
As such, TRC’s are a crucial step in the argument which states that real conflicts 
and social cleavages cannot, nor should they be, emasculated behind a façade of 
consensus but that conflict by civil war, firing squad or show trial is disastrous for 
a nation’s future well being. For that reason and that reason alone, they represent 
the distinctiveness of negotiated revolutions from the modern revolutions of the 
past two centuries or so.  
 
From Festivals of Violence to Festivals of Hope  
 
In the modern era, revolutions have been seen as festivals of violence, fights to the 
finish in which one side vanquishes the other, an ultimate victory in which a new 
order is instituted while the ashes of the old are still burning. Of course, history 
tells a somewhat different story: the 1789 Revolution ushered in a decade of 
domestic strife in France, opening up the way to dictatorship and war; the 
Bolshevik Revolution was followed by a four-year civil war in which foreign 
armies and their proxies fought fiercely with the Red Army; the two-stage Chinese 
Revolution was separated by a battle for domestic hegemony which lasted for three 
                                                 
11 This is not to say that truth commissions originate with negotiated revolutions. In fact, 
they first appeared during the 1980s in Latin America as a means of hearing from, and 
compensating, families of those who had ‘disappeared’ under military dictatorships. As they 
have developed, truth commissions have become far more complex, reaching their apogee, 
at least to date, in South Africa. 
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decades. Even after these revolutions, the new regimes struggled to impose their 
authority on their wider societies, hence Robespierre’s Terror, Stalin’s forced 
collectivization and purges, and Mao’s Cultural Revolution, all attempts to shore 
up revolutionary regimes from opposition at home and abroad, real and imagined.
12
  
Negotiated revolutions offer a radically different conceptualization of 
violence than past examples of revolution. Negotiated transformations are not 
violent fights to the finish but relatively peaceful processes in which deals are 
struck between revolutionaries and their adversaries. First, overt violence is 
contained – both sides seek a settlement of previously irreconcilable differences 
without recourse to coercive power, although, of course,  these conflicts featured 
varying degrees of overt violence leading up to the revolutionary dénouement 
itself. Second, violence tends to appear in latent, structural form rather than as an 
explicit policy tool. Structural violence emits an unfortunate residue for the 
incoming regime; the social legacy imparted by authoritarian rule on the new order 
remains a difficult and pressing issue for Czech, South African and Chilean 
leaders. Yet this is a long way removed from the divisiveness and rupture 
experienced by past revolutionary states. Third, the outcome of the revolutionary 
struggle is not the battle between revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces 
common to previous revolutions. This is because the proselytising vision offered 
by these states is one rooted in the underlying principles, norms and practices of 
the international system itself: support for multilateralism and international 
organizations; a liberal view of progress; and a concern for welfare and 
development. In this way, negotiated revolutions avoid the extreme levels of 
violence, both domestic and international, which have plagued so many revolutions 
in the modern era. 
Of course, there is no necessary or inexorable link between this lack of 
overt violence and negotiated revolution. Many revolutionaries and members of the 
old regime in South Africa and the Czech Republic would have been content to 
continue fighting in the hope of ultimate victory. Miroslav Ransdorf, Deputy 
Chairman of the Czech Communist Party, remains convinced that if the communist 
regime in the Czech Republic had not lost its nerve, they could have restored order 
through the use of force. One current member of the South African government 
told me with a certain degree of regret that the struggle had not afforded him the 
chance to drive a tank victoriously through the streets of Pretoria. One only has to 
look at the heated debates that dominated the pages of The African Communist 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s and at the levels of violence which continue 
to plague South Africa today to realize the centrality of violence to that 
transformation. The crucial point is that, if a negotiated revolution is to succeed, 
both sides must renounce violence as a legitimate policy tool. As the old regime 
tends to retain control of the coercive apparatus longer than any other means of 
authority, this decision is primarily the preserve of the old guard. Hence the 
                                                 
12 The proclivity of revolutionary regimes to domestic tyranny is evidenced today by Fidel 
Castro’s regular crackdowns on domestic dissent in Cuba. 
232 Negotiated Revolution 
concern over the night of 5 October 1988 that the Chilean junta might not accept 
the result of the plebiscite which ended its rule, the relief among leaders of the 
1989 general strike in the Czech Republic that the army was not called in to restore 
order, and the uncertainty among leading ANC cadres over whether the armed 
forces would play a neutral role during the negotiating process and the 1994 
elections. In each case, the role of the coercive apparatus was critical but uncertain. 
In each case, elites chose not to use the force available to them. 
The lack of a recourse to armed conflict by old regime elites in Chile, 
South Africa and the Czech Republic contrasts starkly with the decision by the 
Chinese politburo to employ the army against student protesters in Tiananmen 
Square in June 1989, a policy which helped to successfully defuse large scale 
opposition to the regime over the subsequent decade. It is now common knowledge 
that in East Germany, Erich Honecker came close to deploying the armed forces 
against protesters, until he was persuaded otherwise by Mikhail Gorbachev among 
others. In Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu’s elite force, the Securitate, failed to 
defend the leadership against a determined uprising. Neither China nor Romania 
experienced negotiated revolutions, yet East Germany did. In each case, it was a 
conjunction of elite action, domestic opposition and external forces, both structural 
and agential, which determined the immediate path of the insurrection.  
These examples serve up two main lessons. First, as has been stressed 
throughout this study, violence and revolution are tied together contingently rather 
than by necessity. Second, revolutions do not follow settled, inexorable paths. 
They are critical junctures which may lead in any one of a number of directions. At 
all times, revolutions are a complex interplay between changing structural 
conditions and collective action. One element which differentiates negotiated 
revolutions from past revolutions is that, once the revolutionary situation is in 
place, actors from both sides of the barricades choose roundtables rather than 
guillotines.  
 
From Guillotines to Roundtables 
 
The great revolutions of the modern era are all marked by a particular event, an 
icon which comes to embody the very essence of the revolutionary struggle itself. 
The storming of the Bastille, the raid on the Winter Palace and the Long March 
undertaken by the remnants of Mao’s army are all revolutionary mementos par 
excellence, symbols of the might of the revolutionary struggle and the relative 
weakness of the old regime. Negotiated revolutions do not lack for these great 
moments. The daily demonstrations in Wenceslas Square and the release of Nelson 
Mandela aptly indicate the emotive appeal of these transformations. Yet while the 
central motif of past revolutions has been explicitly associated with armed 
rebellion, negotiated revolutions take on a somewhat different character – the 
power of the masses to be sure, but not that of the mob. Rather, the control of 
fervour and the dignity of protest rise above the social context defined by the old 
regime. Central to this success is the process of negotiation between old and new 
elites. 
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As argued in Chapter Two, revolutions must be relatively quick in order 
to differentiate them from processes of transition and longer-term evolutionary 
change. This does not rule out some degree of variation – after all, the whirlwind 
of talks held in three short weeks in the Czech Republic seems light years away 
from the three years of tortuous stop-start negotiations in South Africa. But what 
unites these cases with past revolutions is that the outcomes were neither inevitable 
nor miraculous, neither the necessary consequence of particular structural 
alignments nor the intended, rational consequence of individual actions. Negotiated 
revolutions are marked by uncertainty and flux, moments when the outcomes were 
unclear and the path to peaceful resolution unlikely. As such, these processes serve 
as powerful examples of the dynamic interplay between structure and agency, 
necessity and contingency, cause and outcome.  
Again, a counterfactual helps to clarify this point. In the early 1990s, 
Burma, now Myanmar, appeared to contain all the necessary ingredients for a 
negotiated transformation. The end of the Cold War removed the last vestiges of 
international support for the military junta. The regime ruled over an inherently 
unstable, corrupt, devalued political order; the economy was in a parlous state; and 
the atomized social order shut off the elite in Rangoon from the views of the 
general public. Opposition coalesced around a popular leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, 
who represented a viable alternative, boasted considerable domestic and 
international legitimacy, and possessed the necessary resources by which to 
challenge the authority of the military regime. Although some reforms were 
initiated, including the onset of roundtable talks, the opposition failed to oust or 
even significantly dent the authority of the military regime. In a way reminiscent of 
how the military junta in Chile successfully saw off opposition protests in the early 
1980s, Burma’s generals kept a firm grip on power. Despite displaying the right 
credentials, neither a transition nor transformation has taken place in Myanmar 
over the last decade. This failure serves as a warning to those who ignore the 
intricacies of revolutionary processes and who postulate from the lofty heights 
afforded by hindsight on the inevitability of historical processes which, on close 
inspection, reveal a logic quite removed from their suppositions. Revolutions, 
negotiated or otherwise, do not come, nor are they made. Rather, they are an 
intricate conjunction of historical context, social conditions and political action. 
 
From Tyranny to Weakness 
 
In the past, the causes, events and outcomes of revolutions were closely bound up 
with the state. First, the revolutionary situation emerged out of a crisis rooted in the 
state. Defeat in war, economic collapse and the like served to fatally destabilize the 
old regime. Second, revolutionary events were largely ordered around a fight for 
control of the state. Third, the revolution was considered to be over in the short 
term when one side seized control of key state apparatus. Finally, in the long term, 
in order to shore up their regime from opposition both at home and abroad, 
revolutionaries built vast state bureaucracies and armies, exerting domestic 
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authority through rigorous mechanisms of surveillance and control. As a result, 
post-revolutionary states possessed a double strength. In Michael Mann’s terms, 
they enjoyed both a considerable infrastructural capacity and a despotic potency, 
strengths which more often than not spilled over into tyranny.
13
 
This pattern is not repeated by negotiated revolutions. Like past 
revolutions, negotiated revolutions stem from systemic crisis in which the 
declining legitimacy of the old regime is of cardinal importance. But at no point 
does the old regime collapse. There is no process to mirror the French defeat in the 
Seven Years War, the Russian trauma over defeat to Japan in 1905 and the First 
World War, or the Japanese invasion of Manchuria for the Chinese. These events 
fatally undermined the old regime, providing staging posts in the slide towards a 
revolutionary situation. But in negotiated revolutions, both the old regime and 
belligerents approached the negotiating table from positions of mutual dependence. 
Neither side in the Czech Republic or South Africa, nor for that matter in Chile, 
had any hope of outright victory. It was the weakness of both sides which 
compelled them to negotiation.  
The process of the revolutions themselves is also distinct from the fight 
over the state common to past revolutions. Negotiators deal with a set of issues far 
removed from those which concerned previous revolutionaries: the make up of 
transitional bodies, the electoral process, the role of a constitutional convention and 
so on. Again, the example of Chile is a reminder of the relative partiality of that 
process compared with the more wholesale processes which took place in South 
Africa and the Czech Republic. In Chile, debate was restricted within parameters 
prescribed by the old regime’s Leyes de Organicos. Root-and-branch constitutional 
change was put off, remaining out of the reach of reformers throughout the 
subsequent decade. In contrast, negotiators in South Africa and the Czech Republic 
were able to achieve far-reaching changes as the first step to establishing a new 
order. 
Similarly, the outcomes of negotiated revolutions fall some way short of 
the tyranny which marred revolutionary states in the past. Because negotiated 
revolutionaries seek to ‘catch up’ with democratic states, they sign up to a raft of 
international treaties, institutions and ordinances which restrict their freedom of 
manoeuvre, particularly over fiscal policy. The negotiations themselves 
circumscribe the potential for radical change, witnessed for example by the sunset 
clauses and power-sharing agreements which formed a central part of the 
negotiations in South Africa. Because they face neither substantial domestic nor 
external opposition, revolutionaries have no need to build up mass armies or 
extend coercive control around the country. In fact, in all three cases, incoming 
governments sought to contain rather than expand the authority of the armed forces 
and security apparatus. Such revolutionaries have no desire to export their 
revolution abroad by force. Equally, no counter-revolutionary force is unleashed to 
contain or overthrow the new regimes. The outcome of negotiated revolutions is to 
strengthen the liberal international order.   
                                                 
13 For more on this, see Mann (ed) (1990). 
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Whither Revolution? 
 
In the contemporary world, while citizens of what Robert Cooper calls the ‘post-
modern world’ enjoy what seems to be a perpetual peace, around a billion people, 
or one in six of the world’s population, live in countries mired in civil war or at 
high risk from falling into such conflict.
14
 Neither of these worlds is without its 
problems. In advanced market democracies, uncertainty, social dislocation and the 
difficulties associated with managing freedom – what the novelist Monica Ali calls 
the ‘limits of autonomy’ – all present their concerns for policy makers.15 In 
Cooper’s ‘pre-modern’ world, poverty, disease and increasing inequalities generate 
friction which all too often spills over into open conflict.
16
 As numerous scholars, 
among them Stuart Hall and Anthony Giddens, point out, modernity has fashioned 
a world without certainties, one in which people must get by without either the 
absolute values or the social institutions that sustained order in the past. Given the 
incongruity and uncertainty that characterizes modernity, a continuation of the 
constitutive role played by processes of radical change seems assured. The 
question is, which of modernity’s prophets – Marx, Kant, Weber or Hobbes – is the 
best guide to the dislocations of the contemporary era; perhaps Nietzsche is more 
suited to a world devoid of absolutes? What, if any, is the future of revolutions in 
all this?
17
 
 Of course, there is no finite answer to the first of these questions. Karl 
Popper famously quipped that ‘the social sciences have not as yet found their 
Galileo.’18 Social scientists engage in prediction, a process Popper saw as more 
akin to prophecy or sophistry, at their peril and it is neither the role of this study 
nor my goal more generally to muse over the future shape of world politics like a 
modern-day soothsayer. However, this study has taken a stand on the second of 
these questions: the role of revolutions, or at least the part played by negotiated 
revolutions, in contemporary world politics. In the first instance, negotiated 
revolutions demonstrate the possibility of states ‘catching up’ with the West in a 
way which would have been recognizable to Trotsky almost a century ago. On the 
other hand, negotiated revolutions contest some of the core features of world 
politics, not least the role played by unfettered markets. All too often, states 
undergoing negotiated revolutions have seen a commitment by international actors 
to establishing free markets fail to be matched by a nurturing of the social and 
political institutions which are germane to the functioning of a consolidated market 
democracy. Heeding Polanyi’s lesson as to the necessity of nurturing a ‘market 
society’ alongside a ‘market economy’ is critical if international agencies are to 
                                                 
14 Figures taken from Paul Collier, ‘How to Stem Civil Wars: It’s the Economy Stupid’, 
International Herald Tribune, 21 May 2003, p. 13. 
15 For more on this, see Mulgan (1997).  
16 For more on this, see Cooper (2000). 
17 This question is considered at some length in Foran (ed) (2003). See also two pertinent, if 
somewhat conservative, articles by Snyder (1999) and Nodia (2000). 
18 Popper (1957: 1). 
236 Negotiated Revolution 
deal more effectively with societies facing similar pressures and going through 
comparable processes in years to come. 
 Above all else, it is clear that the management system of contemporary 
world politics, whether that be the bequest of an imperial power or hegemon, a 
coalition of great powers or multilateral centres of governance, needs to take 
ongoing pressures for radical change seriously. The example of South Africa, one 
of the most remarkable testimonies to the politics of the possible of this age, or any 
other, reminds us of what can be achieved through human agency. Even in the 
most inhospitable of domestic environments, belligerents convened a common 
future based on mutual respect for what appeared to be inalienable differences. Not 
everything in South Africa has changed – nor has it done so in previous 
revolutions. But in South Africa, a radically new order has been instituted which 
bears little resemblance to its predecessor. Contrast the case of South Africa with 
the current state of affairs in West Asia, particularly in Iraq, and it becomes clear 
that there is no inevitable set of conditions which dictate that future 
transformations will be carried out along relatively peaceful lines. Rather, the 
prospect and actuality of violent conflict remains one of depressing familiarity to 
people all around the world. In Burma, Cuba, North Korea and other such 
societies, authoritarian regimes hold an unsustainable grip on their publics. If the 
events of 1989 and after tell us anything, it is that even the most apparently 
unyielding of systems is inherently unstable. The essential question of our times is, 
will this instability be resolved through the pitched battles and firing squads 
common to times of yore or via the round tables and negotiated settlements which 
offer an alternative path out of seemingly intractable conflicts?  
 The three case studies in this book are reminders of the persistent capacity 
of world historical processes, inherent in human agency, to surprise: there were 
few academics, activists or mystics who foresaw the collapse of communism, the 
end of apartheid or the overthrow of the Pinochet regime. As such, it does not seem 
out of place to see negotiated revolutions as a contemporary form of what E.H. 
Carr calls a ‘realistic utopia’: the promotion of peaceful change rooted in the 
conditions of the age, yet which carry with them the possibility of progress.
19
 Over 
upcoming years, we will see whether negotiated revolutions traverse the 
recalcitrant line between idealism and realism, avoiding the perils of an overly 
optimistic, naïve altruism on the one hand and the crudeness of a raw struggle for 
power on the other. That is both the ultimate question and the fundamental 
challenge to come.  
                                                 
19 Unfortunately, Carr’s vision of a world in which ‘British policy must take into account the 
welfare of Lille or Düsseldorf or Lodz as well as the welfare of Oldham or Jarrow’ looks 
unrealistic even today, 65 years after it was first proposed. Carr (1939: 219).  
